# Astroworld Disaster



## TorrieS (Nov 8, 2021)

'This was not a concert, this was a fight for survival' | CNN

Concertgoers described the event as traumatizing, with many witnesses saying they saw lifeless bodies being trampled amidst the chaos.



www.cnn.com





So I'm sure everyone has heard of the Travis Scott concert this past weekend where at least 8 people died due to crowd surge. Other than responding quicker when it happens, how can this type of event be avoided? While I'm currently at a tiny venue that would never dream of crowds like this, I've worked at venues like this in the past (and probably will in the future) and this sort of thing gives me nightmares! I'm mostly talking about how to mitigate the "crowd surge" behavior. I know that having more security on hand and perhaps an artist who isn't instigating that type of behavior is probably the first step!


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## macsound (Nov 8, 2021)

Sounds like a sad and unnecessary way to die. 
I'm confused about what happened. It was just overcrowded and people were literally smooshed to death?
I'm not a regular attender or outdoor concerts but the most obvious way to avoid this is capacity restrictions. Just because it's outside doesn't mean egress can be ignored.
In the outdoor events I have attended there are ushers that maintain walkways and "ticketing tiers", essentially selling the pit as a different tier because it's enclosed, close to talent, camera risers and the mix position. 

Again, not a huge outdoor concert goer and I can see how free-for-all festivals like Coachella can become a mess.


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## TheaterEd (Nov 8, 2021)

I do not have a primary source for this information that I can cite, so this first part is mostly speculation and should be edited by mods if they think it is inappropriate. I trust your judgement.

From what I've read, one of the huge problems that allowed this to happen was that some of the dividing barriers were trampled which allowed a larger crowd to crush towards the stage. The first thing that could have been done is that as soon as the barrier went down, the show needed to come to a halt and lights turned on until it was repaired.

I think back to my young-dumb-concert-goer days and the feeling of the crush in a 5,000 person venue. Multiply that by 10 and if you don't have proper crowd separations, then it is not hard to see how this kind of thing can happen. According to the NYTimes article, the concert didn't stop until 40 minutes after the dangerous situation presented itself. The justification used was that they didn't want to incite a riot and make things worse by cancelling the concert. But that doesn't really pass the sniff test for me.

I look forward to more information becoming available, because the failure to control this crowd is completely unacceptable. 

One thing I have enjoyed in the past few days is the amount of "Artists saving audience members" videos and stories that have been getting posted online.


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## TimMc (Nov 8, 2021)

Live Nation, the promoter, has a track record of deaths and injuries (they were the promoter on the Radiohead roof collapse in Canada, where they took ZERO responsibility).








Live Nation, a company behind Astroworld, has a long history of safety violations

Live Nation is the biggest live-events company in the world. Court records and federal citations show that the company was already linked to 200 other deaths and 750 injuries before Friday's tragedy.



www.npr.org





Artists are not off the hook; there are currently 3 lawsuits filed naming the performers, too.


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## TorrieS (Nov 9, 2021)

TheaterEd said:


> the show needed to come to a halt and lights turned on until it was repaired


Heck, they needed to do this when the fans rushed the gates and took down the metal detectors. 

more info on their security and safety plans here, apparently they did not have a contingency for Crowd Surge? https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/08/us/astroworld-festival-operations-plan/index.html


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## TheaterEd (Nov 9, 2021)

TorrieS said:


> Heck, they needed to do this when the fans rushed the gates and took down the metal detectors.
> 
> more info on their security and safety plans here, apparently they did not have a contingency for Crowd Surge? https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/08/us/astroworld-festival-operations-plan/index.html


"Crowd management techniques will be employed to identify potentially dangerous crowd behavior in its early stages in an effort to prevent a civil disturbance/riot."

Yeah, I feel like fans rushing the gates and taking out metal detectors would qualify as "potentially dangerous crowd behavior".

" using the code "smurf" for a suspected deceased victim. "Never use the term 'dead' or 'deceased' over the radio," the plan states."

So they planned a cutesy code word that implies a person turned blue and died due to asphyxiation, but did not mention crowd crush, crowd surge, or crowd panic in this plan. They do mention a separate risk assessment plan so I guess we wait for that.

It's really interesting to see the PR spin that certain articles put on Travis' actions versus the way his actions are interpreted on other sites. He's definitely got a good PR team.


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## RonaldBeal (Nov 9, 2021)

From ESTA/Event safety Alliance:
ANSI E1.9-2020 Crowd Management


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## gafftaper (Nov 10, 2021)

Assuming this guy actually is an EMT who was working during Astroworld and not just a rando making stuff up... This is a pretty disturbing view of what happened. 
NSFW Language warning.


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## TimMc (Nov 10, 2021)

Doesn't load/preview...


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## dbaxter (Nov 10, 2021)

I feel so out-of-date. I don't go to a concert unless I have a reserved seat.


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## dvsDave (Nov 10, 2021)

TimMc said:


> Doesn't load/preview...


Here's a youtube video that has stitched together footage of the concert with all 3 parts of the medic's account.


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## TimMc (Nov 10, 2021)

Nobody should die for a good time.

As a matter of discussion - what would have mitigated the risk? Heavier barriers? More "security"? More uniformed law enforcement officers? Lower crowd density?

All of those have negative connotations or represent only minimal improvement in managing the crowd. When an audience is bent on rushing the stage I'm not sure what, short of armed response, would act as a temporary deterrent. And an armed response from civil authorities would pretty much guarantee a riot, so what are the available tools?

To keep this in context, I'm sure the prospect of a riot was on the minds of almost every production person there. Had I been a camera operator, I'd have more expected an attack than "please help, there are people dying here", and that certainly could have become the case if things had gone further.

So if YOU were working a gig where this occurred... how would you respond? We have more potential threats in production that we've ever had in the history of our industry...


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## dvsDave (Nov 10, 2021)

TimMc said:


> Nobody should die for a good time.
> 
> As a matter of discussion - what would have mitigated the risk? Heavier barriers? More "security"? More uniformed law enforcement officers? Lower crowd density?
> 
> ...


This article actually answers most of your questions.








Adelman on Venues: Last Night at Astroworld

HOUSTON - On Nov. 6, lawyer and VP of the Event Safety Alliance Steve Adelman addressed the tragedy that happened Nov. 5 at the Astroworld Festival in Houston, TX. On Adelman on Venues, Adelman offered advice to


plsn.com


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## TheaterEd (Nov 10, 2021)

This incident actually had me thinking a lot about Summerfest here in Milwaukee. The per day average for Summerfest in 2019 was 65,000. In all my years attending I never recall feeling the crush like I have when going to shows at The Rave in Milwaukee and I realize now that it is because of the benches. As an attendee, I HATE, the benches. You can't sit on them because everyone stands anyways, and inevitably everyone is standing on them which makes for a wobbly concert experience. HOWEVER, because of the bleachers, there are always walkways through the crowds, and getting a density high enough to cause a crush is just not possible. 



So now I find myself in the precarious scenario where I agree with having the bleachers in front of the stages, but I'm still going to be grumpy about it.


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## bobgaggle (Nov 11, 2021)

TheaterEd said:


> This incident actually had me thinking a lot about Summerfest here in Milwaukee. The per day average for Summerfest in 2019 was 65,000. In all my years attending I never recall feeling the crush like I have when going to shows at The Rave in Milwaukee and I realize now that it is because of the benches. As an attendee, I HATE, the benches. You can't sit on them because everyone stands anyways, and inevitably everyone is standing on them which makes for a wobbly concert experience. HOWEVER, because of the bleachers, there are always walkways through the crowds, and getting a density high enough to cause a crush is just not possible.
> 
> So now I find myself in the precarious scenario where I agree with having the bleachers in front of the stages, but I'm still going to be grumpy about it.


so what if you replace the benches with short fence sections organized in some useful way. gives people something to stand near/lean on and creates walkways to get to your main 'aisles'. And would break up the crowd so a massive surge isn't possible...


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## TheaterEd (Nov 11, 2021)

bobgaggle said:


> so what if you replace the benches with short fence sections organized in some useful way. gives people something to stand near/lean on and creates walkways to get to your main 'aisles'. And would break up the crowd so a massive surge isn't possible...


Just because I'm part of the herd doesn't mean I want to feel like a sheep. 

My thought is that any kind of fencing solution would be subject to getting moved by the audience. Either by them over packing a section and causing it to bulge or by the audience just moving them. And if the fencing doesn't move, then you get the problem of people packing in from both sides and crushing towards the middle.


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## dvsDave (Nov 11, 2021)

TheaterEd said:


> Just because I'm part of the herd doesn't mean I want to feel like a sheep.
> 
> My thought is that any kind of fencing solution would be subject to getting moved by the audience. Either by them over packing a section and causing it to bulge or by the audience just moving them. And if the fencing doesn't move, then you get the problem of people packing in from both sides and crushing towards the middle.


Depends on the configuration. Have you ever seen some of the crowd modeling done on for Roman Colosseum? A thing of beauty. Columns that break up crowd movement, high stacked seating to prevent crowding, the width of the lower stairs increases as you go lower. It's a thing of beauty and proves that we can use the environment to control crowds. 



There's an entire formalized crowd management methodology, known as DIME-ICE to deal with crowds. It's part of the ANSI standard for Crowd Management. (ANSI ES1.9-2020)

In general, though, you can control crowd crush by breaking up the crowd into smaller units. Crowd crush depends on a critical mass and by breaking up the layout, you can control the density of the crowd.


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## gafftaper (Nov 11, 2021)

This is a photo of the layout. I'm no expert, but I believe this is actually considered to be a fairly good anti-surge strategy. Those fences break up the crowd and give security a lot of access into the crowd. They also used the good fences, not just bicycle racks as early posts claimed. This is the kind with the elevated platforms on the back that allow security to see over the crowd. Which takes us back to questions like why did the concert continue 40 minutes after it was declared a mass casualty event.


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## dvsDave (Nov 11, 2021)

gafftaper said:


> This is a photo of the layout. I'm no expert, but I believe this is actually considered to be a fairly good anti-surge strategy. Those fences break up the crowd and give security a lot of access into the crowd. They also used the good fences, not just bicycle racks as early posts claimed. This is the kind with the elevated platforms on the back that allow security to see over the crowd. Which takes us back to questions like why did the concert continue 40 minutes after it was declared a mass casualty event.
> View attachment 22394


Do we know where the VIP entrance is, that's where the crowd broke past the ticketing area.


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 12, 2021)

Some Ground Truth, from the associated press:








70 minutes at Astroworld: A countdown to catastrophe

Anticipation had been building for hours, but never more than now, as the red numerals on the countdown clock disappeared and the first synthesized notes vibrated. An image of an eagle in a fireball hovered above the stage, a neon red tunnel appeared and eight towers of flames rose to the sky.



apnews.com


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## DMXUser (Nov 13, 2021)

RonaldBeal said:


> From ESTA/Event safety Alliance:
> ANSI E1.9-2020 Crowd Management


If you haven't seen a FEMA Planning Template for the Security, Crowd Control, Medical and Fire Response etc, here's the list of the FEMA ICS Forms. 

The most important Form in this ICS Protocol is called the INCIDENT ACTION PLAN or IAP. 

The IAP outlines numerous scenarios and what pre-planned actions need to be executed.

EVERY Event Employee should at least read through the Templates and have an idea of what happens when.





Emergency Management Institute | ICS Fillable Forms





training.fema.gov


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## MNicolai (Nov 13, 2021)

gafftaper said:


> This is a photo of the layout. I'm no expert, but I believe this is actually considered to be a fairly good anti-surge strategy. Those fences break up the crowd and give security a lot of access into the crowd. They also used the good fences, not just bicycle racks as early posts claimed. This is the kind with the elevated platforms on the back that allow security to see over the crowd. Which takes us back to questions like why did the concert continue 40 minutes after it was declared a mass casualty event.



I think I posted it to the Discord channel and probably Reddit but haven't gotten into it here. Here is what I posted to Reddit about when you actually map out the square footages of [Event Lawn] - [Technical Areas] - [Barrier Areas] - [Obstructed Viewing (side areas with trees] to get an idea of audience square footage and crowd density.

...if you map out the concert grounds in Google Earth, you'll discover there's about 135,000SF of audience areas, though practically 20,000SF is obstructed viewing, technical areas, or barricaded off, so you essentially have 50,000+ crowding into 115,000SF. We have no idea how many people stormed the gates, but let's say it's as few as 2,000 non-ticketholders stormed the gates. That ends up being 115,000SF / 52,000 patrons = 2.2SF/patron.​​There are studies of crowd density, referenced in the Event Safety Guide, published by the Event Safety Alliance, that document states that around 3SF/patron, crowd density is uncomfortable and around 2SF/patron, psychological effects of a densely crowded mass of people can create panic and dangerous crowd forces. Effectively, the crowd no longer behaves like individuals but like a fluid or an amoeba.​​If the event were held in a football stadium, it would fundamentally alter crowd density. People would be better contained to manageable areas with limited occupancy per area, clear pathways between them, and improved egress and right-of-way of security/medical teams. In an open air festival such as this, no such compartmentalization of audience areas exists and crowd density can continue to escalate and crowd surge can propagate across the entire audience plane.​​To my knowledge, we have no idea how many non-ticketholders stormed the gates. Some were likely ticketholders who wanted to get up front as early as possible in the day, but on top of them was it 200, 2,000, or 5,000 additional people? In any case, their crowd density was pushing that 2SF/patron critical threshold before those additional non-ticketholders were factored in.


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## MNicolai (Nov 13, 2021)

TheaterEd said:


> This incident actually had me thinking a lot about Summerfest here in Milwaukee. The per day average for Summerfest in 2019 was 65,000. In all my years attending I never recall feeling the crush like I have when going to shows at The Rave in Milwaukee and I realize now that it is because of the benches. As an attendee, I HATE, the benches. You can't sit on them because everyone stands anyways, and inevitably everyone is standing on them which makes for a wobbly concert experience. HOWEVER, because of the bleachers, there are always walkways through the crowds, and getting a density high enough to cause a crush is just not possible.
> 
> So now I find myself in the precarious scenario where I agree with having the bleachers in front of the stages, but I'm still going to be grumpy about it.


Summerfest is a completely different behemoth. There's nothing like Astroworld at Summerfest. Summerfest has like 12 or 15 stages, and the two largest venues on-site have dedicated seating available, one of which is reserved seating. There's no circumstance where all 65,000 would be consolidated at one or two stages. I have a similar love/hate relationship with those bleachers, but Astroworld was _designed _so that the headliner on the mainstage was where everyone would flock to at the end of the night. There was no act on the side stage during Scott's headlining performance. 50,000+ people were descending on a single event lawn.


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## TimMc (Nov 15, 2021)

Death toll up to 10. Nine year old Ezra Blount died as a result of his injuries at Astroworld.


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## TheaterEd (Nov 15, 2021)

MNicolai said:


> There's nothing like Astroworld at Summerfest.


Totally agree with you, this is just the first time that I looked at Summerfest trough the lens of crowd control and now see some merits to those darn bleachers. It's easy to see how the scale of this can cause things to go wrong without and appropriate plan.


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 24, 2021)

DMXUser said:


> The most important Form in this ICS Protocol is called the INCIDENT ACTION PLAN or IAP.



For those who have never worked anything big enough to run into ICS (I haven't, but I'm a systems nerd):

Incident Command System is the federal agency standard for incident response planning and execution; the idea is that everyone who works for any organization which might be called to respond to something are all working out of the same playbook; it details what different types of services are necessary, who provides them if that agency is available, who is in command of the incident, and how that devolves upwards as higher ranking individuals arrive on-scene, and like that.

That's the one-graf version.

Here's the 30-graf version:








Incident Command System - Wikipedia





en.wikipedia.org





If things get to city- or metro-level, then you probably have enough stuff going on that you're looking at NIMS:





National Incident Management System - Wikipedia





en.wikipedia.org


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 24, 2021)

[ Side Hobby Horse Rant: NIMS outlaws brevity codes in favor of plain language. (Specifically 10-codes, but other things too.)

As both a 40 year ham and an ostensible communications professional, I understand what they're driving at, but it's my analysis that they've blown it.

The problem with Plain Language is *exactly* the same as that of 10-codes: there's too much of it. Aside from the "not having to talk about the rape in front of the victim" feature, brevity codes have the advantage that -- as long as everyone is using the same dictionary -- there's no evaluation cycle; I don't have to *figure out* what the other guy (who might be from a neighboring state with a vastly different accent) *even said*, before I can start figuring out what he meant. Everyone involved did all that work already, before going into the field.

Their evaluation was "brevity codes are bad".

The correct evaluation, IME, is "*existing* brevity codes are bad, but brevity codes -- per se -- are *good*". ]


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## FMEng (Nov 25, 2021)

They knew what they were doing because there is no standard for brevity codes. That means different jurisdictions don't use the same codes. Put a collection of people together from a wide area, and they won't be able to communicate using brevity codes. Consequently, one person is saying 10-33 for "help me quick," and the other person thinks it means "disregard." APCO codes are also different from Ham codes. The codes are OK if Hams are talking to Hams, or the East Podunk PD is talking amongst themselves.


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 25, 2021)

Absolutely.

So the solution to that is not to get rid of brev codes. It's to *create one from scratch*, and promulgate it to all comers.

No offense, FM, but I'd thought I was pretty clear... :-}


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## FMEng (Nov 25, 2021)

A standard? I'm not sure that's possible among local government agencies, and states and the feds are loath to force anything on them.


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 25, 2021)

Yup. A standard.

Given all the things you do for a living, I'd have thought you would have a different opinion of the Feds' ability to impose standards on people...


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## TimMc (Nov 25, 2021)

Code Smurf. Yeah, that's really professional.

With emphasis on interagency, on site disaster communication, one would think a common language would be part of the communications system.


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## Jay Ashworth (Nov 26, 2021)

TimMc said:


> Code Smurf. Yeah, that's really professional.
> 
> With emphasis on interagency, on site disaster communication, one would think a common language would be part of the communications system.


It's not clear whom you're spanking, Tim. Only that you are.


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## TimMc (Dec 5, 2021)

The Houston Chronicle has some stunning reporting on this excrement escapade:








How warning signs leading up to deadly Astroworld Festival show catastrophe weeks in the making

A Houston Chronicle investigation uncovered critical failures by multiple authorities and missed warning signs at Travis Scott's Astroworld Festival, where 10 people died and countless others were injured in November 2020.



www.houstonchronicle.com





The tl;dr version for the ADD readers:








8 important revelations from our in-depth Astroworld investigation

Our reporting found critical failures by multiple authorities tasked with ensuring the...



www.houstonchronicle.com


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## dvsDave (Dec 5, 2021)

Hitting a paywall, and wow, their prices are high! $4.99 a week for digital edition


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## TimMc (Dec 5, 2021)

dvsDave said:


> Hitting a paywall, and wow, their prices are high! $4.99 a week for digital edition


Hint - use a java script blocker. ("Rosebud" didn't come cheap) This is a scrape of *most* of the second-linked article.
1. Organizers were concerned about adequate staffing for the event​ 
Weeks before Astroworld, officials working for Harris County expressed concern that there were not enough concert staff for the festival, given the expected attendance of 50,000. Normally, the county provides medical and security personnel for events on the NRG campus, which licensees — in this case, concert promoter Scoremore Shows, pay for.


On the day before the festival, however, the county and Scoremore signed the first and only amendment to the Astroworld Festival contract, requiring the promoter to hire additional security staff and medics on its own. Whether Scoremore fulfilled its end of the bargain — or how the county verified this— remains unclear.


2. Some security guards were hired at the last minute​ 
Samuel Bush, a 46-year-old cook from Aldine, said he and his nephew were hired as security guards the day before Astroworld via a text message. Neither received any training or background check. Bush said they were among more than 100 guards who showed up in the parking lot outside the venue and were issued vests that said “security.” Bush said no one was asked if they were licensed — a requirement under Texas law. Bush’s nephew has a license, but he does not.


3. The event operations plan was inadequate, experts say​ 
A key document was supposed to ensure the safety of every person at NRG Park during the festival: the event operations plan, which the event contract required Scoremore to prepare and get OK’d by Harris County.


The 56-page plan outlines procedures for several types of emergencies, including hazardous weather, active shooters and mass casualty events.


The document makes no mention of the gate breach at the 2019 Astroworld Festival, nor previous security incidents at Scott concerts. It is also silent on how to respond to crowd crush events, which have a documented history of occurring at concerts and sporting events where spectators stand in enclosed areas.


Paul Wertheimer, a crowd safety expert who was a spokesman for the city of Cincinnati when a crowd crush before a concert by The Who killed 11, said this was a critical omission.


*STORIES OF ASTROWORLD:* Concertgoers look back on the tragedy


“It does not address any of the challenges of a standing room festival environment, which is historically the most deadly configuration in live music entertainment,” Wertheimer said. “As a result of not acknowledging these audience challenges, it’s not really possible to address in an emergency, even after best efforts are made.”


Houston Police planning documents obtained by the Chronicle show police decided to staff the festival with off-duty officers, as well as members of its Special Response Group and SWAT team. The documents note the problems with the 2019 event and stated the 2021 event "will have a heavier presence" of law enforcement and fire/EMS.


4. The Houston Fire Department was not in the main festival command post​ 
The Houston police and fire departments — the two public safety agencies with primary jurisdiction over the festival site — set up their trailers almost a mile away from the main stages. There was also a main festival command post closer to the two stages. The fire department did not post a representative here, however, and whether the police did is unclear.


*MIXED SIGNALS:* Houston firefighters struggled to communicate with medics during Astroworld chaos, union head says


Promoters and their private medics communicated with first responders via cell phone, according to fire department officials. That was an issue, said Marty Lancton, president of the Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association.


“Cellphones during an emergency situation are often not reliable and not what Houston firefighters use to communicate on an emergency scene,” Lancton said.


5. The venue layout was dangerous, experts say​ 
The viewing area was divided into four pens, each enclosed by barriers on three sides and bisected by two narrow walkways for security and first responders. The pens were so wide, about 100 feet from the entrance to the furthest barricade, that fans pushing into the open ends would have no idea if they were compressing others far inside.


A safer layout would have included various exit points along the barriers, where the crowd could spill out and relieve pressure as needed, said Brian Gant, a former Secret Service agent who has helped organize security for large events, including presidential inaugurations.


“I didn't see any of that,” Gant said. “What I saw was, when people got into the area, literally where they stood, that's where they were. You literally could not move. It's just a recipe for disaster.”


6. There were warnings signs of a crowd crush right before Travis Scott took the stage​ 
Closely packed crowds can quickly become dangerous. When crowd density exceeds about seven people per square meter, participants lose control of their bodies and the mass begins to behave like a liquid, crowd science expert John J. Fruin wrote in a 2002 paper. Shock waves can reverberate like water sloshing in a bathtub, containing enough force to propel people as far as 10 feet and rip off clothing and shoes.


Those trapped may be unable to expand their diaphragms, restricting blood flow to the brain and heart and causing cardiac arrest, said Houston Methodist internal medicine physician Dr. Josh Septimus. This condition, called compressive asphyxia, can cause death within minutes, even if a victim is upright.


*'WORST-CASE SCENARIO': *How a crowd surge can create a deadly combination of health risks


A report by scientists on the 2010 Love Parade festival disaster in Germany lists warning signs a crowd crush may be imminent, including fans being unable to move freely and fans attempting to escape enclosed areas. If this occurs, police and security personnel should evacuate the affected areas and be prepared to render first aid, the researchers recommended.


Shortly after 8:30 p.m. the night of the festival, videos show security guards helping five fans out of the pen closest to the stage on the left side. In one, a fan lies on the ground, being examined by a guard with a flashlight. In another, a woman’s voice yells “help” twice.


Scott took the stage at 9:02 p.m. Two minutes later, a shot on the concert broadcast of the left rear pen shows the crowd there exhibiting fluid characteristics. Parts of the mass stretch and then compress.


This is a textbook sign of a crush, said crowd science expert Keith Still, and demanded immediate action by concert staff.


“You can definitely see the precursors to shock waves,” Still said. “People are unable to find their own footing; the crowd is swaying to and fro. That’s the type of thing you see in high-risk environments.”


7. Nearly an hour elapsed between the first report of an injury and the end of Scott’s show​ 
The first responder radio call for a person with a potential crushing-type injury came at 9:18 p.m. The fire department made its first mass dispatch of ambulances at 9:38 p.m. This when police say they told concert promoters that because several people had collapsed and needed CPR, the show needed to end.


Police said the promoters agreed. However, police made a critical call to leave this decision in the hands of the festival management. The show continued for another 36 minutes until Scott finished his final song at 10:14 p.m.


HPD Chief Troy Finner would later say his department lacked the power to halt the performance. The city charter, however, charges the police department with keeping the peace in all public places.


8. The festival never broadcast any safety messages during the disaster​ 
The operations plan provided scripts for how the PA announcer could alert attendees of an emergency. At no point would the festival’s speakers or video boards broadcast any safety messages, attendees said.


After police said they told promoters that multiple fans had collapsed and the show needed to end, Scott’s set continued as if nothing were amiss. For more than half an hour, medics trudged in the dark through the dense crowd attempting to locate, evaluate and transport fans in distress.


The first official notice that something had gone awry at Astroworld came at 12:20 a.m., when the police department posted on Twitter about an “NRG Park incident.” Many concertgoers had no idea others had been injured and killed.


Much is still unknown about why the festival went so terribly wrong. The Harris County officials who run the NRG campus, as well as the festival promoters, police department and main private security company for the event refused requests for interviews, leaving many questions unanswered. The findings so far, however, point to a catastrophe weeks in the making.


_St. John Barned-Smith and Jasper Scherer contributed reporting._


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## TimMc (Dec 23, 2021)

Congress-critters get involved, sending letter of inquiry to Michael Rapino...








Congressional Panel Launches Investigation Into Promoter Of Deadly Astroworld Concert

Ten people were killed during a massive crowd surge at the concert and attendees were packed so tightly that many could not breathe or move their arms.



www.huffpost.com


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## avkid (Jan 11, 2022)

So.......we had a team onsite there.
The "artist" has a track of inciting the audience even before his shows on social media.
Crowd barrier layout was not in any way unconventional.


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